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FACING THE AGING WAVE:
PROPOSED SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE
PHILIPPINES
Les Coughrant
Abstract: The Philippines's Social Security System is eroding because of
demographic changes. These changes have tipped the financial balance, which
incremental design changes have failed to restore. The system contains weaknesses that
are exacerbated by limited financial transparency and poor asset management.
International social security systems, designed to include public defined benefit
programs, public hypothetical account programs, publicly mandated defined contribution
programs, and/or private sphere components, provide the Philippines with examples of
alternate national systems. While each of these components alleviates certain risks, no
single component is comprehensive in safeguarding against demographic, economic, or
inflationary risks.
This Comment asserts that the Philippines should reform its public social security
system and adopt a new diversified program. Consistent with the World Bank's
recommendations, the Philippines should blend a hypothetical account-based public
retirement benefit with a defined contribution retirement program. This diversified
program will increase retirement income for a broader range of the population, while not
materially increasing the national government's risk exposure. Most importantly, this
program will secure the long-term viability of distributing social security benefits.
I. INTRODUCTION
Changes in demographics due to an aging population are undermining
the Philippines's system for social security financing. This Comment
identifies several causes of the Philippines's social security financial
imbalance and suggests a specific model for reform. The retiree's financial
security, society's macro-level economic stability, and the relative fairness
of the available designs are balanced in formulating a new social security
t The author would like to thank his wife Janelle for her patience and support; it is greatly
appreciated. In addition, the author would like to recognize the efforts of John Pierce for sharing his
experience and knowledge of Asian financial law, and Professor Roy Prosterman, Director of the Rural
Development Institute, whose seminar laid the foundation for this project; without either of their continued
commitment, this Comment would not have been published.
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policy' while recognizing that social security programs have both a
substantial social and economic impact.2
This Comment argues that the Philippines should modify its social
security system by adopting a blended "hypothetical account ' 3 and "defined
contribution ' 4 design. This proposed reform would involve changing the
current social security benefit formula and adding tax-subsidized defined
contribution savings accounts. This design recommendation is adapted from
the World Bank's preferred model of social security financing, and is
tailored to meet the needs and capacity of the Philippines.5 The proposed
reform is beneficial because it arguably reduces the economic, financial, and
' National social security programs can encompass a variety of economic protections, including
access to health care, disability insurance, childcare, unemployment income and retirement income. This
Comment, analyzing "social security policy," is limited to post-employment income sources for the elderly
from government-sponsored or subsidized programs. This includes public retirement income systems and
private pensions or savings accounts. Pre-retirement life, disability, and health insurance, while important
economic protections, are specifically excluded for purposes of this Comment.
2 The economic impact of social security programs is substantial. The annual cost of these
programs, on average, in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, is at least eight percent of annual gross domestic
product. DAVID LINDEMAN ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF PENSION SYSTEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA: OPPORTUNITIES, CONSTRAINTS, AND DILEMMAS 9 (2000),
http://www.oecd.org/pdfIM00028000/M00028932.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2002). Reasonable baseline
projections estimate that these costs will increase to over fourteen percent of annual gross domestic product
within the next few decades. Id.
' As used in this Comment, a "hypothetical account" retirement system uses personal contributions
to determine retirement payments. Like a savings account, an individual would make "contributions,"
which are social security tax payments. Also like a savings account, an individual would receive "interest,"
which is a benefit credit for prior contribution periods. This "interest" adjustment makes the account
balance accumulate as if it were a funded savings account. The "account" is a bookkeeping device to track
implicit payment promises. The credits used to calculate retirement payments are pooled into a person's
"account," but the account is fictional. Unlike a savings account, which is directly funded with assets, a
hypothetical account has no corresponding investments and is not directly funded. There is no specific link
between tax collections and benefit payments (i.e., benefit obligations do not correspond with any
accumulated assets or tax collections, and the benefit obligations do not fluctuate based on the underlying
assets). These "accounts" make up a tracking system that is effective to bring costs in line with each
individual's tax payments. While the terms used to describe this account give the appearance of a funded,
contribution-based scheme, the hypothetical account program is not funded. It is simply a different way to
communicate benefits under an unfunded social security program. This program is more effective in
communicating value to the public and total costs to politicians than a regular defined benefit program. See
infra Part IV.A for further discussion on the hypothetical account model that is proposed for the
Philippines.
' Defined contribution designs are individual savings accounts. MUKUL ASHER, FINANCIAL CRISIS
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PENSION FUNDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,
http://www.worldbank.org.cn/english/content/pensionl.html (on file with author) (last visited Dec. 4,
2001). The accounts are at all times fully funded. Id. The account's value fluctuates with the value of the
underlying assets being held. See infra Part IV.B for a further discussion of the defined contribution model
proposed for the Philippines.
5 See ROBERT HOLZMANN, WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK APPROACH TO PENSION REFORM 9-10
(1999), available at http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/HDNet/HDdcos.nsf/2d5135ecbf351de6852566a
90069b8b6/a9f42f87 1 de2fa9985256794005e9816/$FILE/9807.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2002).
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demographic risks associated with providing retirement benefits through
diversification.
6
Part II reviews the current social security system in the Philippines,
examining the strengths, weaknesses and viability of the current program.7
Part III surveys potential social security designs, including the World Bank's
recommended diversified "multi-pillar" approach.8  Part IV recommends
that the Philippines adopt a blended multi-pillar design, based on the World
Bank model. This multi-pillar design involves redefining the current
retirement benefit formula into a hypothetical account-based system. In
addition, the proposed reform recommends adding a defined contribution
program. Finally, Part V concludes that the suggested transition to the
proposed blended design is both beneficial and feasible.
II. THE EXISTING PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM: STRUCTURE,
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND COMING CHALLENGES
The Philippines currently maintains a partially funded "pay-as-you-
go"9 social security system. This system collects a portion of current
employee wages through a social security tax,' ° and with those funds pays
current eligible retirees monthly retirement income.' t The Social Security
System ("SSS"), similar to the United States model, covers only private
sector employees. 12 The existing system is classified as a "defined benefit"'
' 3
6 Id. (stating that changing the parameters of retirement programs, like retirement age, is politically
unattractive and is a difficult way to implement social security reform).
' The World Bank has several key areas of concern in social security system designs. Those key
areas of concern are: "(1) short term financing; (2) long term viability; (3) effects on economic growth; (4)
adequacy and distributional issues; and (5) political risk." DAVID LINDEMAN, WORLD BANK GROUP,
INCENTIVES AND DESIGN ISSUES IN PENSION REFORM, http://www.worldbank.org.cn/english/content/
pension6.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2001).
8 Under the terminology used by the World Bank in evaluating social security financing methods,
each "pillar" is a distinct funding arrangement that provides retirement income. LINDEMAN ET AL., supra
note 2, at 6. "Pillar one" programs are systems in which the national government guarantees a stream of
retirement payments based on a benefit formula. Id. at 13. "Second pillar" systems are mandatory defined
contribution systems, in which a national government requires savings, but the accumulated account
balance determines benefit payments. Id. "Third-pillar" arrangements are private sphere, either individual
or employment-based, supplemental retirement income systems that are supported through tax subsidies.
Id.
9 A "pay-as-you-go" social security system does not have a funded link between taxes collected and
benefits paid. See HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 7. Despite the appearance to the individual that they are
paying social security taxes for their own benefit, the taxes collected are used to pay current retirees. Id.
'0 OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, [UNITED STATES] SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD - 1999, at 283 (1999), http://www/ssa/gov/
statistics/ssptw/1999/English/index.htmIl (last visited Dec. 31, 2002) [hereinafter OFFICE OF POLICY AND
RESEARCH].
I11/d.
12 Government employees are covered under a separate, but similar system. Id.
MARCH 2003
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
system, because the "benefit formula"'14 provides a specific monthly
payment during retirement.
The current SSS follows a specific statutory structure, which defines
the benefits payable, individual eligibility rules, and tax collection.1 5 These
design features provide important protections for the aging. Despite these
safeguards, the existing SSS is rife with problems. These problems are
caused by the internal structure of the SSS as well as outside political and
social factors. The SSS design also negatively affects the Philippine
economy. These weaknesses undermine the program's viability, and create
a need for reform.
A. Current Social Security System Design Features
The specific attributes of the current Philippine SSS are delineated in
this section, outlining the basic structure of the system and detailing various
strengths and weakness that necessitate reform. The SSS requires
participation for a broad class of individuals, and provides fixed monthly
retirement payments. 16 These payments begin at a relatively rigid retirement
date. SSS benefit payments are funded through a labor tax, paid by both
employer and employee, which are not directly linked with individual
benefits.
1. The Benefit Structure of the Existing System
The SSS is planned to provide specific benefits for a distinct portion
of the Philippine population. The SSS is designed to be a broad-based,
compulsory retirement program. Participation is required for private sector
employees under age sixty, household employees earning at least 1,000
" As used in this Comment a "defined benefit" pension system refers to a particular type of benefit
formula used in the retirement system. Under a defined benefit formula, individuals are promised a
specific fixed retirement payment amount each period (i.e., monthly). Note that the benefit formula is
distinct from the "pay-as-you-go" financing method. Compare discussion supra note 9. This distinction
highlights an important feature of pension systems: promised benefits and the method of accumulating
funds to pay those benefits are two distinct features and are not necessarily connected to one another.
ASHER, supra note 4.
4 As used in this Comment, the "benefit formula" is the statutory provision that determines how
much income a retiree receives.
'5 OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at v (social security programs reported by the
Social Security Administration are only those established by statute).
i" Individuals receiving retirement benefits have their monthly amounts adjusted for inflation on an
ad hoc basis. Id. at 283.
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pesos 17 per month, and self-employed individuals with more than 1,000
pesos per month of income. 18  Civil servants and military personnel are
covered under a separate, but similar, system.
19
The SSS pays a fixed monthly amount to eligible retirees.2 ° While not
a formal obligation to continue making payments, future retirees expect
these payments to continue.2 1 An average worker in the Philippines, whose
wages are subject to the social security tax, can expect to receive a monthly
retirement benefit payment. The payment is determined under the statutory
benefit formula and is equal to the greatest of the following amounts:
300 pesos, plus 20% of the average monthly "credited earnings,,
22
plus 2% of the average monthly credited earnings for each year of
service in excess of 10 years; or
40% of average monthly credited earnings; or
1,200 pesos if the insured contributed for at least ten years but less
than 20 years, or 2,400 pesos if the insured contributed for more than
2320 years.
Eligible retirees receive these payments monthly from retirement until
death.24
Under current law, the formal retirement age is rigid.2 5 Individuals
are eligible to retire at age 60 if they are not employed, and have 120 months
of credited earnings.26 Payments must start by age 65, even if the individual
27
remains employed, provided 120 months of credited earnings are recorded.
If the retiree does not record the necessary 120 months of credited earnings,
he or she is not eligible to receive monthly benefits as detailed in the benefit
17 The exchange rate was US$ 1.00 per 39.55 pesos when the Social Security Administration
researched these formulas. Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 LINDEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 7.
22 "Credited earnings" describes the wages that are counted for calculating retirement payments. Id.
The types of wages used in the formula are limited. OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at
283. Certain earnings are not used, or "credited" under the formula. Id. For example, monthly wages in
excess of 12,000 pesos per month (the "social security wage base") or wages that were not reported to the
social security system, which previously went untaxed, are not counted when determining retirement
payments. Id.
2 id.
24 Id.
25 This rigidity reduces the financial flexibility available to adjust the systems for demographic
changes. See HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 7.
26 OFFICEOFPOLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 283.
27 Id.
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formula.2 8 These ineligible retirees receive a single "refund" payment as a
lump-sum.2 9 The lump-sum payment equals the employee's and employer's
contributions, plus 6% annual interest. M
2. The SSS is Funded Primarily on a "Pay-as-You-Go" Basis Through
Payroll Taxes
The benefits provided under the Philippine social security system are
funded through a payroll tax. The government collects payroll taxes to pay
benefits to current retirees. The contribution rate for retirement, death and
disability programs under the SSS is 8.4% of the first 12,000 pesos of
income per month.3 The employee pays 3.33% and the employer pays
5.07% of wages, up to the social security wage base, as taxes.32
While tax collection serves as the means to pay for retirement
benefits, there is no funding link between individual tax payments and
retirement benefits disbursed to that person. 33 Therefore, the system is
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. Even though workers pay social security
taxes, no specific funds from those taxes are set aside for that particular
worker's expected retirement payments.
34
B. The Current SSS Design Has Inherent Strengths
There are several inherent strengths to the current SSS design. The
existing program protects against the three primary risks to retirees:
poverty, inflation, and longevity. Besides these primary protections, the
current SSS gives some lifestyle flexibility to those who are beginning
retirement and protects certain dependants against the early death of the
retiree. 35  In addition, the SSS has accumulated an asset surplus, which
provides financial security to the governmentand retirees beyond the current
social security tax collection.36
28 id.
29 Id.
30 Id. This credited interest rate is well below the market rate. ASHER, supra note 4.
3' OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 283 (based on 1999 income levels).
32 id.
33 id.
34 ASHER, supra note 4.
35 OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 283.
36 ASHER, supra note 4.
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The current SSS successfully reduces poverty among the elderly,
meeting the primary social role 37 of social security. The program replaces
about 60% of pre-retirement income.38  These replacement levels are
substantial when compared with the replacement levels of other pay-as-you-
go defined benefit social security systems, which are substantially lower.39
Specific features of the benefit formula also aid the poverty-reducing effects.
The monthly payments made under the benefit formula are mildly
progressive40 and include a subsidy for low lifetime earners.41
The risk that inflation will destroy the buying power of a fixed
payment is addressed through an inflation adjustment.42  Payments to
retirees are adjusted on an ad hoc basis for inflation.43 This readjustment for
inflation helps maintain the system's poverty protection, and keeps the
payments from being substantially reduced by inflation over time.
Longevity risk, the risk of outliving available financial resources, is
substantially reduced by the primary "form of payment., 44  The current
program largely prevents eligible retirees from outliving their income by
providing a monthly payment from retirement until death.45  Thus, a retiree
37 See, e.g., [UNITED STATES] PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE:
TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 41-44 (1981) (stating that the current role of social
security is to provide a minimum floor of protection for the aged), reprinted in JOHN H. LANGBEIN &
BRUCE WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 41 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2000).
38 ASHER, supra note 4.
3' For comparison, the "replacement rate" of a U.S. worker that has average career earnings of
$30,000 per year is 30% under the United States social security prograim. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note
37, at 37.
40 "Progressive" is a normative term used to describe a program that benefits those who are poor
more than the rich. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 842 (6th ed. 1991) (defining progressive tax as a
type of graduated tax which applies higher tax rates as the income of the taxpayer rises). Conversely, a
"regressive" program benefits the wealthy more than the poor. See id at 889 (defining a regressive tax as a
tax for which rates decrease as the taxed base, such as income, increases).
41 The formula provides a guaranteed minimum payment for individuals with 120 credited earnings
months, but whose average credited earnings are not large enough to produce 1,200 or 2,400 pesos of
retirement income. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
42 Economists describe the purchasing power of a dollar amount as the "real" value. See, e.g.,
FREDERICK MISHKIN & STANLEY EAKINS, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND LNSTITUTIONS 61 (Denise Clinton et
al. eds., 3d ed. 2000) (describing the real value of money in terms of actual goods and service that can be
purchased). This is in contrast with the "nominal" value, which is the face value of money. Id. For
example, if you were to give a retiree 100,000 pesos today in cash, with which he is able to buy a 100,000
peso car, the real and nominal value of the cash would both be 100,000. Now, assume instead it is twenty
years in the future, and the cost of the same car has increased to 200,000 pesos. When the retiree is
provided the same 100,000 pesos, he or she is only able to pay half of the price. While the nominal value
of the cash remains $10,000, the "real" value has declined by half because of the increase in the cost of
goods.
4" OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 283.
44 A "form of payment" as used in this Comment describes how the value of the benefit owed under
the benefit formula is transferred to a retiree. Forms of payment encompass both the amount of payments
and the period over which a retiree will receive these payments.
4 OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 283.
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who has enough credits to earn retirement benefits receives poverty
protection until his or her death.
In addition to the formula-based protections, the current SSS has
several non-formula-based strengths. Certain beneficiaries are protected
against the early death, including pre-retirement death, of a household
earner.46 Individuals who have contributed for 120 months are eligible for
either: i) a joint and survivor annuity for individuals with a spouse or
dependants; 47 or, ii) for those without eligible dependants, an annuity with
48sixty payments guaranteed. The determination of which death benefit
protection a retiree receives is made at the time of death, 49 rather than at the
time of retirement. Consequently, a retiree gets the best available
alternative. For example, if a retiree has children or a spouse at the time of
retirement but not at death, the SSS will disburse the remaining payments,
for up to sixty months, to the person's parents or other descendants, rather
than not paying any death benefits. 50  These death benefit protections are
paid in addition to the regular retirement benefit that a retired dependent
may be receiving based on their own eligibility. 51  Households that have
sufficient contributions by both spouses receive double benefits under the
survivor annuity provisions.5
Another non-formula-based strength helps retirees with the transition
into retirement. The retiree has the option to receive his first eighteen
payments in a lump sum, discounted at a preferential rate of interest.5 3 This
availability of additional funds at the start of retirement allows more lifestyle
flexibility, by permitting retirees to have greater access to cash. This single-
sum payment allows a person to purchase larger durable goods or relocate
for retirement.
46 id.
41 Survivors of an old age pensioner receive 100% of the pension plus the dependant supplement. Id.
A dependant supplement is the greater of 10% of the old age pension or 250 pesos per month. Id. Each
child up to 5 under the age of 21 (including those conceived but not yet born) qualifies. Id. Children who
are incapacitated and incapable of self-support from a congenital defect or disability acquired before age 21
continue to receive the supplement for their lifetime. Id.
48 In the Philippines, if the participant dies within sixty months of the pension payment beginning, a
lump sum equal to the remainder of the first sixty months is paid to dependent parents or other descendants.
ld.
I. 49 Id.
50 Id.
51 id.
52 The payment of double benefits can be avoided by using imputed earnings to the surviving spouse,
rather than a survivor annuity. See [United States] Social Security Administration, How your Retirement
Benefit is Figured, S.S.A. Pub. No. 05-10070 (2000), http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10070.hml (last visited
Dec. 31, 2002) [hereinafter How your Retirement Benefit is Figured]. Under an imputed earning design,
the surviving spouse then gets the better of the two wage histories. Id.
"3 OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 283.
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The government of the Philippines has collected more in social
security taxes than it has paid retirement benefits to date, and thus has
accumulated a surplus.54 The total accumulated surplus for the SSS and civil
service pension funds exceeds ten percent of annual GDP.55  This
accumulated surplus provides a small buffer between the mismatch in tax
collection and benefit payments. 56
C. The Current Social Security System Has a Plethora of Weaknesses
While the SSS provides several important safeguards, there are a
variety of weaknesses in the current design. These problems stem from both
the internal structure of the SSS and external social and political factors.
1. Weaknesses in the SSS Stemming from Internal Structure of the SSS
Although the structure of the SSS provides many benefits, there are a
number of weaknesses in the internal structure. The financial consequences
of five internal factors severely limit the longevity of the SSS.
The first weakness in the SSS is that the financial characteristics of
the obligation to pay retirees and the means to collect and accumulate the
funds with which to pay retirees are very different. For instance, the
obligation to pay retirees will increase as the overall life expectancy
17 57increases, 5  as non-formula benefits are available, or as payments are
adjusted for inflation.5 9 The wage-based social security tax revenue used in
the Philippines fluctuates with economic cycles and the number of
employees in the workforce. 60  Any accumulated assets (i.e. excess tax
collections from prior periods) will fluctuate according to the investment
choices. 6 1 Typically, investments in financial assets decline in value during
inflationary periods when the cost of the SSS would be rising.62 In order for
54 ASHER, supra note 4.
55 Id.56 The relative costs of the SSS are in line with the average costs of other social security systems in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia that exceed eight percent of gross domestic product. See LSNDEMAN ET
AL., supra note 2, at 9. The relative buffer provided by surplus assets is evaluated in relation to these
overall costs.
57 The total number of payments made to an individual increase as they live longer. See discussion
supra Part II.A.1 (detailing the current SSS benefit formula). The payments are not reduced for any
longevity changes. See discussion supra Part H.A. I (detailing the current SSS benefit formula). Id.58 See discussion supra Part lB (detailing the non-formula based benefit obligations).
59 See discussion supra Part 11.13 (describing the inflation adjustments to the SSS payments).60 See discussion supra Part lI.A.2 (discussing the employment based SSS tax).
61 See discussion infra Part II.C.2.c.
62 See THE VANGUARD GROUP, BULL AND BEAR MARKETs, at
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payments to be made from the SSS trust funds to retirees, sufficient funds
must be collected or accumulated. The government of the Philippines, by
guaranteeing to pay a fixed monthly benefit, remains exposed to the risk that
there are insufficient assets or funds to make such payments.
The magnitude of the mismatch between the potential revenue and the
SSS obligations is greater than necessary because of the type of benefit
formula used and non-formula-based benefits. Under the current formula,
the total financial value of the series of SSS payments increases as people
live longer.6 3 Thus, the actual total value of these payments varies by the
individual's life expectancy. The non-formula-based protections, like
survivor benefits and the possibility for retirees to get the first eighteen
payments as a lump sum, create additional uncertainty and make estimating
the total value of retirement benefits more difficult. 64 By making the best
possible retirement death benefit available,65 the costs of these protections
are not determined until the death of the retiree. Total SSS costs are affected
when retirees chose to claim the first eighteen payments in a lump sum, 66 at
a preferential rate of interest. This subsidized initial payment supplies a
benefit that is more valuable than the usual series of payments under the
benefit formula.67 It is difficult to project with accuracy the costs of the SSS
when the election of this more valuable disbursement remains a retiree
choice.
The second internal weakness in the current SSS is that the individual
remains exposed to substantial inflation risk. Close scrutiny of the benefit
formula 68 reveals only partial protection of retirement income against
inflation risk, because of ad hoc inflation adjustments.6 9  The existing
inflation protections are not consistently applied or routinely implemented .7
http://flagship3.vanguard.com/web/ planret/AdvicePTIBMarketsBullAndBearMarkets.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2003) (indicating that increasing inflation is a negative signal to financial markets).
63 Under the present benefit formula, individuals are promised the same (inflation adjusting) benefit
for life. OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 283. The present value of a monthly annuity
over a longer period of time is more valuable than an annuity for a shorter period of time, where monthly
benefits are the same. See STEPHEN ROSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 790-91 (Gina
Huck ed., 4th ed. 1998) (comparing present value of a fixed annuity over various periods at different
discount rates).
6 Financial analysis requires an estimate of cash-flow. ROSS ET AL., supra note 63, 265-327. If
there are errors in the cash-flow estimates, such as those created by contingent payments, the financial
analysis based on those factors can be misleading. Id. at 327.
65 See discussion supra Part II.B.
66 See discussion supra Part II.B.
67 See STEPHEN ROSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 790-91 (Gina Huck ed., 4th
ed. 1998).
61 See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
61 OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCII, supra note 10, at 283.
70 id-
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Furthermore, there is no pre-retirement inflation protection; under the
current pure averaging formulas, inflation reduces the value of career
earnings over time. Consequently, retirees who were exposed to pre-
retirement inflation have the real value of their retirement payments reduced
because the real value of their credited earnings, which are used to determine
payments under the benefit formula, are reduced. 2
The third internal weakness is that the benefits paid from the program
are regressive; greater benefits are paid to the wealthy, notwithstanding the
fact that the individual monthly payments are slightly progressive.73 While a
uniform benefit formula implies that each person receives an equal benefit,
in reality each person receives only similar monthly payments. The value of
the series of payments each retiree receives depends upon his or her life
expectancy.7 4 Certain occupations, like mining, farming, and other manual
labor professions, are higher risk and more physically grueling. Those
employed in high-risk industries have decreased overall life expectancy.75
Under a benefit formula with a rigid retirement date and fixed payments
thereafter, value is transferred away from riskier and more physically
draining occupations to those in less risky occupations; 76 slightly larger
payments over a much shorter period of time are less valuable than slightly
smaller payments over a much longer period of time.
The fourth internal weakness is that the individual costs are also
regressive. The poor get less and pay more. The tax used to fund the
program is regressive because it costs the poor a greater percentage of their
income than the wealthy.77 The maximum wage base of 12,000 pesos per
month78 makes the required employee contribution regressive,7 9 despite
71 While not recommended in this Comment, because of the proposed "hypothetical account" design,
there is a simple design solution to cure this pre-retirement inflation risk. Annual wage credits can be
adjusted for inflation when converted into a benefit credit. See How Your Retirement Benefit is Figured,
supra note 52.
72 See generally supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining the economic concept of real
value).
73 See generally supra note 40 and accompanying text (defining "progressive" and "regressive" tax
structures).
74 See ROSS ET AL., supra note 63, 138-39, 790 (calculating the present value of an annuity; showing
that value increases as more payments are expected).
75 THE WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT BRIEF NUMBER 44: REDISTRIBUTION ACROSS INCOME LEVELS
IN PAY-AS-You-Go (1994), http://www.worldbank.org/htnl/dec/Publications/Briefs/DB44.html (last
visited Dec. 31, 2002).
76 See generally The Future of Social Security for this Generation and the Next-Implications of
Raising the Retirement Age: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Social Security ofthe House Ways and
Means Comm., 105th Cong (1998) (statement of David A. Smith, Director, AFL-CIO Public Policy
Department) [hereinafter Smith].
OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 283.
78 id.
79 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 75.
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uniform rates. As the individual's income rises above 12,000 pesos per
month, a higher paid worker pays a lower percentage of their wages to the
system.
The tax collected under the 12,000 pesos per month wage ceiling is
also regressive, despite a purported uniform rate. By defining tax payments
as coming from the "employer" and the "employee," the uniform tax
becomes more regressive. The employer portion of the social security tax is
economically a hidden tax on the employee,80 despite the different labels.
While economically the "employer" and "employee" social security taxes
are identical,81 the income tax treatment of these payments differs. The
employer gets a deduction for all social security taxes paid as part of
wages.82  Employees pay both social security tax and income tax on their
3.33% contribution. 3  The "employers" 5.07% social security tax is not
subject to income tax.8 4  Consequently, a portion of the employee's
economic wage8 5 is exempt from income tax. Since the income tax in the
Philippines is progressive,86 rising income levels increase the employee tax
savings from the SSS income exemption. The tax benefit of this exempt
income is greater as incomes rise. As a result, the tax treatment of the SSS
87
contribution is regressive.
A fifth internal weakness is achieving broad coverage 8  in the SSS,
despite the broad eligibility requirements. 89 In 1993, the civil service and
military pension scheme covered about 1.4 million employees, 90 while the
so See generally JOSE PINERA, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR PENSION REFORM, EMPOWERING
WORKERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN CHILE, http://www.pensionreform.org/cllO.html
(last visited Dec. 31, 2002) (examining generally how the cost of labor taxes under defined benefit systems
is really a tax on the employee regardless of who is labeled with the tax obligation).
81 See id. (indicating that "employer" labor taxes are economically taxes on the employee regardless
of label).
82 PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES 193 (1993). Where an employer pays
employee wages, the full wage (including employee social security tax) and the employer social security
tax are deductible as a business expense. Id. Thus the employer does not actually absorb any of the social
security tax cost.
83 OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 283.
84 id.
"5 The economic wage as used here is the employer's cost of hiring an employee. Since the
employee absorbs both social security taxes, as used here, the economic wage is taxable wages (which
includes the employee social security tax) plus the employer social security tax.
86 The Philippines has seven marginal tax brackets with the highest marginal tax bracket being 35%.
PRICE WATERHOUSE, INDIVIDUAL TAXES, A WORLDWIDE SUMMARY 78 (1997).
" Note that since the majority of the social security tax is "employer" paid, see discussion supra Part
II.A.2, the social security tax is much more regressive than the national income tax.
88 ASHER, supra note 4.
89 See discussion supra Part I.A. 1.
90 See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
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SSS had a membership of about 17.8 million. 91 In 1995, the World Bank
estimated that the Philippines had a work force of 28 million and a total
population of 69 million. 92  Thus under the current system, a substantial
portion of the population is not covered by either the civil service or public
SSS system.93
Low coverage is likely the result of the labor market structure.
Individuals who are not part of formal labor markets are not eligible for
social security benefits because they fail to have 120 monthly contributions
recorded to the SSS.9 4  In communities where the financial system or tax
collection agency is not developed enough to facilitate payroll and income
tax collection, or where wages are paid in non-reported cash or barter
exchanges, populations are unable to accumulate sufficient credits with the
SSS.95 With no minimum pension safeguards, these groups may be totally
excluded from any elderly income security provided by the SSS.96
These challenges reveal a basic structural solvency problem in the
SSS. The costs of projected benefits is uncertain and do not correlate with
sources of revenue.97 Individuals are not fully protected from inflation.98
There are substantial incentives for individuals to avoid participating in the
program because of regressive features, and the tax collection agency has
been unable to reach the informal labor markets. 99  As a result of these
challenges, current annual expenses exceed annual tax revenues.100 The SSS
has operated an annual deficit since 1992, invading investment income to
pay benefits. 10'
91 ASHER, supra note 4.
92 id.
93 id.
94 See discussion supra Part II.A.I (indicating that retirees must make 120 contributions in order to
be eligible for monthly retirement payments).
Id.
96 SOCIAL PROTECTION, THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK PENSION REFORM PRIMER: COVERAGE,
THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION IN RETIREMENT INCOME SYSTEMS 1 (2002), http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/
HDNET/HDdocs/nsf/2d5l35ecbf351de6852566a90069b86b6/16b20a4531313bd085256abd00648164/$FI
LE/N%20Coverage%20v5.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2002) (stating that developing countries are
"characterized by large scale subsistence agriculture that is essentially outside the government's tax net.
What drives the informal sector is likely to drive pension coverage.").
97 See supra notes 57 - 67 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 68 - 72 and accompanying text.
9' See supra notes 73 - 96 and accompanying text.
1e0 ASHER, supra note 4.
101 Id.
MARCH 2003
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
2. External Factors Causing Weakness in the SSS
Aside from the above internal factors, there are several social and
political factors in the Philippines causing further undermining of the SSS
structure. Demographic changes, lack of financial disclosure, and poor
investment returns exacerbate the system's existing internal weaknesses.
a. Demographic changes will expose the weaknesses in the SSS design
The demographic make-up of the Philippines is changing. Generally
as nations develop and personal incomes rise, people live longer and
birthrates decline. These trends are occurring in the Philippines.,
0 2
These demographic shifts will magnify many of the challenges identified
within the current SSS design. Under the current benefit formula, as retirees
live longer, the total value of the retirement payments provided to them
increases. 10 3  Also, as people live longer there are a greater number of
retirees collecting benefits at any particular point in time. This resulting cost
increase, both in total benefits and benefits received each month, will need
to be covered by either accumulated assets or future tax collection. Based
on the current revenue collection, which is below the cost of current
retirement payments, 1°4 additional retirees will accelerate the depletion of
the trust fund, and continue the outflow of accumulated funds for the
foreseeable future.
The total number of retirees can be compared with the tax-paying
workers to create a "dependency ratio," providing a measure of how many
retirees rely on each worker. Going forward under the current design, the
Philippines will face a worsening dependency ratio as its demographics
change.1 5 There will be more retirees supported by fewer workers and the
capacity of these workers to pay social security taxes will be limited.
102 The life expectancy of the general population has increased from 53.375 years in 1960 to 69.272
in 2000. THE WORLD BANK, 2002 WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (The 2002 World Bank
Indicators CD-ROM, current through Jan. 1, 2002) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS]. The crude
birthrate per 1000 people dropped from 44.420 in 1960 to 26.780 in 2000. Id.
... See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.
:D4 ASIIER, supra note 4.
o5 See generally DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, supra note 102.
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b. Inadequate macro-level disclosure prevents the public from
evaluating the financial position of the SSS
In the Philippines, there is inadequate information disclosed about the
performance of the SSS.1°6 No information is available about accumulated
assets or investment performance. 10 7  Furthermore, there is no publicly
disclosed estimate of the system's outstanding liabilities. 0 8  This lack of
publicly available data prevents the citizen inquiry into how the system
functions financially.' 0 9 The lack of publicly available information is
particularly alarming considering that current tax collections do not cover
the current benefit payments and expenses." 0 The investment income of the
accumulated funds covers the current shortfall."' While this does not
create a risk to those currently receiving payments, the rate of using
accumulated surpluses to pay current retirees and not accumulating assets
for the future undermines the program's solvency for the future.
Defined benefit social security systems, such as the current SSS tend to
suffer from political shortsightedness." 2 Politicians often underestimate the
long-term costs of providing benefits" 13 or avoid confronting the long-term
costs altogether. 1 4 Benefits are increased to unsustainable levels for current
retirees to the detriment of future retirees.' 5  This cost shifting is
preventable by disclosing the costs of the current system, both actual and
projected, and educating the public about the financial health of the
program. 16
106 ASHER, supra note 4.
107 id
108 Id.
109 Social security annual reports are neither timely nor informative. Id There is a general tendency
to discourage public discussion of social security issues. Id
110 Id
11Id
112 LAWRENCE H. THOMPSON, MANAGING PUBLIC PENSION PROGRAMS: ANALYSIS OF KEY
ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLICY PROCESSES (2000), http://www.worldbank.ord.cn/englisllcontent/
pension2/shtml (last visited Dec. 4, 2001) ("Experience shows ... [that the people who make pension
prormses] often underestimate how expensive these promises turn out to be.").
113 Id
114 Politicians have no incentive to implement changes to make social security systems solvent
because the benefits would not be realized until long into the future after the responsible politician is out of
office. HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 7. Even marginal reform attempts may cause intense political
backlash. Id.
115 Id
116 THOMPSON, supra note 112.
To be effective in countering the underestimates of future costs, such long-term projections of benefit
costs must (1) be prepared using procedures that provide a reasonable assurance of objectivity; (2) be used
to evaluate both the current benefit promises and the impact of any changes us benefit promises, before
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c. Under-performing assets further reduce the financial solvency of the
social security system
Poor asset management also plagues the SSS. By choosing to invest
directly in private market instruments, the government's investment policies
and performance play a crucial role in ensuring sustainable and adequate
income security for the elderly. SSS asset performance and investment
allocation is unclear, since the assets are carried on the SSS financial
statement 118 at purchase price,l9 rather than the current market cost, thereby
distorting the information that is disclosed. In addition, the financial
disclosures are not audited,120  which reduces the credibility of the
information disclosed. Thus far, SSS investment managers appear unable to
successfully manage the SSS assets. Between 1976 and 1995, the estimated
rate of return of the investment portfolio was below the rate of return on
Philippine government bonds. 21 Since the SSS reserves could have been
invested in Philippine government bonds, in essence the Philippine
government borrowed money only to lose part of it in the Philippine stock
market.
The investment of SSS reserves in private assets makes the
government a stockholder in the nation's private sphere enterprises. The
national government is placed in the position of being both owner and
regulator. The accumulated system assets are invested in public and private
such changes are instituted; and (3) be made available to all interested parties, including woikers and
employers covered by the pension program.
ld.
117 ASIHER, supra note 4. Between 1976-1986, the real rate of return on the SSS investment portfolio
was -0.7% based on unpublished World Bank calculations. Id. Between 1987-1995 the real rate of return
improved to 5.58%. Id. See generally ROBERT J. PALACIOS, MANAGING PUBLIC PENSION RESERVES PART
II: LESSONS FROM FIVE RECENT OECD INITIATIVES (World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper No.
0219, 2002),
http://wbnOO18.worldbank.org/HDNet/HDdocs.nsf/View+to+Link+WebPages/36868B30A2BO659685256
C000073B328?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 1, 2003) (examining institutional structure to effectively
manale social security reserves and strategies for ensuring prudent investment management).
Financial statements are reports created by accountants to disclose the financial performance of an
entity. See ROSS ET AL., supra note 63, at 20-73 (showing the types and uses of financial statements for
evaluating economic performance of an entity). Typically financial statements show an income statement,
which shows the financial gain or loss for the year. Id. In addition, fiancial statements usually show a
balance sheet, identifying the market value of assets and liabilities. Id.119 ASHER, supra note 4.
120 Id.
121 Note that the rate of return is only estimated because the official government report does not
include sufficient information to calculate the actual performance. Id. The World Bank estimates the real
rate of return of the SSS trailed the performance of Philippine treasury bills by 0.59% annually. Id.
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financial instruments, including government securities,1 22  home
mortgages, 123 private loans, 1 4 and publicly traded equities. 12  Government
direct ownership of corporate stock is inherently subject to continued
political manipulation and distorts the efficient use of capital.1
26
Structurally, this choice also causes asset underperformance because of
political influence. 17 Poor asset management creates an additional implicitcost for the taxpayer that is not reflected in SSS accounting.
D. The Current Form of the SSS Has Negative Collateral Effects on
Economic Growth in the Philippines
In addition to their social role, social security programs substantially
affect national economies. 128  The development of retirement savings
programs has the potential to make labor markets more efficient and mobile,
accumulate domestic capital,12 9 stabilize national financial systems, 30 and
promote economic development. As a national economy grows, the
economic strength and position of its poor tend to improve.13  Therefore, a
122 Forty-five percent of the portfolio is held in government securities. Id. This particular figure also
includes bank held time deposits, assets not usually categorized as a government debt obligation. Id.
123 Forty percent of the assets are held in mortgages. Id.
124 id.
125 Approximately ten percent of the assets are held in private sphere assets. Id.
126 [United States] Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, Remarks from 2002 Summit on
Retirement Savings (Feb. 28, 2002) available at http://www.saversummit.dol.gov/greenspan.html (last
visited Dec. 31, 2002).
127 THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK PENSION PRIMER PART I: How WELL Do GOVERNMENTS
INVEST PENSION RESERVES 5 (2002),
http://wbnOOl 8.worldbank.org/HDNet/HDdocs.nsf/view+to+link+webpages/1 ff73e261420a8f4852568ac0
06bb4e9?OpenDocument#PrimerNotes (last viewed Dec. 31, 2002) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, PENSION
PRIMER] (explaining empirically that government managed investment portfolios underperform privately
managed portfolios and this underperformance is related to political influence).
125 The cost of social security systems in Eastern Europe and Central Asia averages at least eight
percent of annual gross domestic product. LINDEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 9. Reasonable baseline
projections estimate that these costs will increase to over fourteen percent of annual gross domestic product
within the next few decades. Id.
129 Dimitri Vinas, Pension Funds and Capital Markets: Investment Regulation, Financial Innovation
and Governance, 71 PUB. POL'Y FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR 1 (1996) (arguing that that funded pension
schemes lead to significant increases in long-term financial savings that can underpin capital market
development.) [hereinafter Vittas, Pension Funds and Capital Markets].
1o Id. at 4 (concluding that pension funds can act as catalysts for the development of efficient trading
and settlement systems, the adoption of modem accounting and auditing standards, and the promotion of
meaningful disclosure).
13 Generally, the average incomes of the poorest fifth of society rise proportionally with average
income. DAVID DOLLAR & ART KRAY, GROWTH IS GOOD FOR THE POOR 1 (World Bank, Working Paper
No. 2587, 2001), http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/pdfiles/growthgoodforpoor.pdf (last visited
Dec. 31, 2002) (examining general trends in ninety-two countries over the past four decades).
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properly designed pension system can both stimulate economic growth and
reduce poverty. 132
Unfortunately, the Philippines is not reaping these benefits. Instead,
its poorly designed social security systems have a distorting impact on work
decisions. 133 In the Philippines, because social security benefits are not
directly linked with contributions, younger workers treat the contribution as
a labor tax. 134 This conception often leads to tax evasion. 135 Under the
current design, both the employer and the employee gain financially by not
reporting wage income, encouraging the use of informal unreported labor. 
36
The use of informal labor limits a nation's future economic growth through
higher transaction costs. 13 7 In addition, the SSS encourages use of inferior
production technology, 138 because the cost of labor to the employer is
cheaper, lessening the incentive to be efficient.
Social security programs that do not use private savings affect a
country's aggregate savings and its capital market development. Capital
accumulation is reduced because private savings institutions and instruments
are not developed, slowing the maturation of financial markets. 
39
E. Future Projections: The Philippines SSS as Currently Designed Is
Not Viable for the Long-Term and a New Design Is Needed
The design weaknesses of the SSS will erode system assets until the
system is no longer viable. Low investment returns have depleted the asset
base of the SSS. 14 ° Existing retirees have adequate benefits, but the system
is operating on a long-term deficit, 141 despite the short-term accumulated
surplus. 142 Annual expenses exceed current tax revenue and SSS trust fund
income has been invaded to pay current benefits since 1992.143 Over time,
as the population structure ages, there will be insufficient accumulated
assets, absent extraordinary investment returns, to maintain benefits at
132 HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 2.
' Id. at 5.
134 id.
135 id.
136 The adverse effect of high contribution rates of traditional defined benefit pension systems,
especially the detrimental effects on labor demands in the formal sector, should be a matter of serious
concern to policy makers. LINDEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 9.
137 HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 5.
:38 LINDEMAN, supra note 7.
39 id.
:40 AsHER, supra note 4.
141 Id.
142 id.
143 Id.
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current tax levels. To keep the SSS self-contained it will need to pay
decreased benefits,' 44 have an increased tax rate or alternate source of
revenue, or cover a lower percentage of the population.1 4 5  While these
solutions are relatively well understood, they are politically unpopular,146
regressive, 47 or create additional political risks. 4 8 Without some design
modification, however, the program will become bankrupt.
There are two potential alternatives for change, that make the SSS
solvent, while keeping the program self-contained financially: incremental
adjustments to the existing design or a new design. The Philippines has
already attempted incremental change to offset the growing liabilities, 149 but
those changes have not made the system solvent for the long-term. Based on
the government's inability to successfully operate the existing design, the
remaining alternative is to redesign the SSS. Pension reform could bring the
system into long-term financial balance without substantially increasing
costs, or moving the program onto the general government budget. Once
reform is undertaken, there would also be an opportunity to correct many of
the other existing defects.
III. WORLD BANK DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS ARE AN APPROPRIATE
MODEL
The circumstances driving the financial imbalance of the SSS in the
Philippines are not wholly unique. In analyzing the shortcomings of similar,
traditional defined benefit social security systems, the World Bank has
identified three potential models, aside from family or local community
arrangements, to finance social security systems. 150  These social security
'" Benefit reduction can be accomplished through decreasing monthly payments, inflation
adjustments, or increasing the retirement age. HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 7. These incremental
adjustments are either regressive or cut into the financial security that the program provides. Id.
14' Certain nations may have organic law impediments to modification of their benefit formulas for
either the public or civil servants. LINDEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 17; see, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art.
XII, §7 (constitutionally protecting accrued pension benefits of public employees).
146 HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 7.
147 Smith, supra note 76; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 75 (indicating longevity differences
between rich and poor are predictable).
148 A redesign of the SSS can be achieved by paying any cost overruns from the general budget.
ASHER, supra note 4. This approach also lowers aggregate savings. LINDEMAN, supra note 7. Moving
expenses into the general government budget also creates additional political risk. Id. Because of the
magnitude of social security costs, the availability of excess funds fluctuates with the national budget.
HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 10. Consequently, payments under social security programs funded through
the general budget tend to excessively respond to changes in the national government's budget. Id.
149 The maximum wage base was increased 20% between 1997 and 1999. ASItER, supra note 4.
150 HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 6-11; ASHER, supra note 4.
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design strategies can be adopted individually or combined to meet the
specific needs of a particular country.
15 1
A. Design Components-Available Alternative Financing Methods for
Social Security Systems
The World Bank calls each of its potential components "pillars." ' A
"first-pillar" program is a defined benefit system, though there is some
flexibility in how the benefits are defined. 153 A "second-pillar" system is a
mandatory defined contribution program. 5 4  "Third-pillar" is used to
describe a tax-subsidized private retirement program. 55 The same shorthand
labels to describe these systems are used throughout the remainder of this
Comment.
The World Bank's "first-pillar" is a "pay-as-you-go" defined benefit
system. 156  The Philippine's current system is an example of a first-pillar
program. Under this system a worker pays taxes, then receives retirement
benefits. These systems are publicly managed, mandate participation, and
are non-discretionary entitlements regardless of income.' 57 The government
serves as the financial guarantor, with payments made according to a
specific formula. Payment formulas are usually earnings-based and can be a
fixed monthly benefit' 58 or of a hypothetical account nature. 159  The first-
pillar system can be unfunded, under-funded or theoretically fully-funded by
equating the benefit formula exactly with payments.160  If the system is
pre-funded to any degree, choices may exist for how the funds are invested
and supervised.'
6 1
151 The World Bank favors a multi-pillar approach, but in a pragmatic and country specific manner.
HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 2. This cautious approach recognizes that the exact mix of policy choices
depends on a nation's starting conditions, expectations, and financing constraints. Id. at 7.
152 ASIIER, supra note 4.
53 id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 id.
"' Taxation can serve as a hidden way to reduce benefits for those with higher incomes, often called
a "means test," in nations that maintain these entitlement benefits. See I.R.C. § 86 (2002). In the United
States, portions of social security benefit payments are taxed. Id. As taxable incomes rise, a greater
portion of the benefit is recaptured in the form of income tax. Id. § I (stating that marginal tax rates rise as
taxable income rises); Id. § 61 (defining taxable income to include a portion of social security benefits).
:58 ASHER, supra note 4.
159 LINDEMAN ETAL., supra note 2, at 14.
'6o This distinction is based on the nature of the benefit formula, and the type of assets used to fund
benefits. ASHER, supra note 4.
16i See THE WORLD BANK, PENSION PRIMER, supra note 127 (examining institutional choices for
asset management of accumulated social security funds).
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The benefits of a first-pillar system are numerous. As currently
provided in the Philippines, the forms of payment provide protection against
both inflation and longevity risks. 162  Moreover, combining household
participation credits or making them transferable to the surviving spouse
upon death can overcome gender inequities in labor force participation.
63
Under this model, society serves as the risk-pooling agent and finances the
risk under general government revenue or a separately earmarked trust fund.
A "second-pillar" arrangement is a mandatory defined contribution system.
Under this model, a worker receives retirement income from a funded
savings account that they have been required to contribute to during their
working career. 164  The amount of retirement income is equal to
contributions made during the retiree's working life, plus accrued interest
and investment earnings, less any fees.1 65 Since benefits and contributions
are directly linked, absent any additional government guarantees, the system
is fully funded at all times from contributions, leaving no possibility of a
funding shortfall. 66 Since each worker receives his or her own contributions
during retirement, there is no redistribution of funds before taxation is used.
Unlike a first-pillar system, where the benefit formula can contain additional
subsidized benefits for the poor, 167 second-pillar systems do not permit
subsidized benefits, absent preferential tax-treatment.
Under second-pillar arrangements, the individual's benefit is linked
with the financial performance of their personal account.' 68 The worker
benefits from investment gains, but also absorbs investment losses. 169 These
systems usually involve uniform contribution rates, and offer a variety of
withdrawal options. 170 Under second-pillar systems each person receives
only what is in their account. 7 1 Thus, explicit provisions need to be made
for both longevity and inflation risk since individuals can outlive their
income stream and inflation erodes the real value of the account.1 72 Also,
since each individual bears the risk of loss, sufficient legal protections need
:62 ASHER, supra note 4.63 See, e.g., [UNITED STATES] SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY SURVIVORS
BENEFITS, Pub. No. 05-10084 (2000).
164 ASHER, supra note 4.
165 Id.
166 id.
167 See discussion supra note 41 and accompanying text.
1 ASHER, supra note 4.69 See id.
170 Id.
171 id.
172 id.
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to be in place to ensure that investment managers act prudently and do not
embezzle or misuse the assets.
173
"Third-pillar" schemes can be introduced as a developing nation's
financial systems and government tax policy mature. As defined by the
World Bank and used in this Comment, "third-pillar" systems involve public
subsidization of private pension schemes, including occupational-based
systems or contractual savings devices through the country's financial
system. 174  These non-mandatory systems can provide defined benefits or
require defined contributions; yet both types of pillar-three benefits are
privately managed and operated. 17 The primary role of these systems is to
provide supplemental retirement income.1 76  These systems exchange tax
advantages for preferred benefit features to workers. 177 A common subsidy
is a deferment of income taxes. 78 Government regulation and tax policy are
used to ensure distributive goals, fund security, and encourage prudent
investment.
179
B. Diversification Among the Alternatives Reduces the Overall Risk
Exposure and Protects Against Greater Risk Alternatives
The World Bank evaluated the various financial components of social
security programs and recommends a program that blends the use of each of
the three pillars described above. °80 Diversification among these three
17 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE:
OECD GUIDELINES FOR PENSION FUND GOVERNANCE (2002), at http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/O,,EN-
document-0-nodirectorate-no-12-35842-0,00.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2003) (offering guidelines for the
administration of private pension funds that are designed to protect individuals' retirement benefit from
mismanagement and fraud; including legal and governance structures to ensure that funds are managed in
the best interests of plan members and beneficiaries).
174 ASHER, supra note 4 (indicating that third-pillar programs are tax-advantaged).
175 Id.
176 LINDEMAN, supra note 7, at 3.
77 For example, in the United States, individuals can defer taxation on retirement assets if the assets
remain in the account until age 70.5. I.R.C. §§ 402(a), 401(a)(9). Substantially more assets are
accumulated because of the larger initial amount through the use of pre-tax funds, and the faster
compounding because of the tax-exempt status. See BERGER FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC, THE POWER OF
TAX-ADVANTAGE COMPOUNDING at http://www.bergerfunds.com/planning/education/compunding.htm
(last visited Dec. 31, 2002) (providing graphical display of the differences in asset accumulation with pre-
tax contributions and tax free compounding compared with assets in accounts without those benefits).
However, if the assets are not used for retirement there is a tax penalty that is assessed on the distribution in
addition to income tax. I.R.C. § 72(t). Hence, there is a substantial economic incentive to earmark assets
for retirement, but once the assets are set aside the availability for other uses is substantially diminished.
"' Dimitri Vittas, Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes, 72 PUB. POL'Y FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR
1, 4 (1996) [hereinafter Vittas, Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes).
"9 See id.
180 HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 2.
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pillars is designed to shelter retirement income sources from various
political, economic, and social risks.' 
81
Risk reduction from diversification occurs for both the individual and
society as a whole. Individuals in a diversified program have a variety of
income sources. They receive publicly guaranteed retirement income from a
pillar-one program, an income stream from market assets that they have
been forced to save over their entire working lives through a second pillar
system, and, finally, third-pillar programs offer additional supplemental
savings that participants have elected to save to avoid any lifestyle decline
during retirement.
A society's risk reduction in a diversified program comes from a
reduction in the national government's guarantor role and the use of broader
tools to subsidize retirement income. The government only serves to
guarantee the income from first-pillar programs.'8 2 Second and third pillars
are fully funded and subsidized annually when contributions are deposited
into the savings accounts. Second and third pillars are flexible tools that
allow the overall design of the retirement income institutions to be modified
according to social need.
C. Remaining Problems with the World Bank Model
While this Comment adopts the World Bank's terminology and agrees
with the concepts of diversification, problems remain with the World Bank
Model. First, the various pension system designs promoted by the World
Bank implicitly assume that formal labor markets exist. 18 3 Government
programs can alter the timing or amount of wage payments through a social
security scheme only after formal wages are paid. Since more than eighty
percent of individuals in low-income countries and forty percent of those in
middle-income countries are informal non-wage workers, 184 few social
security benefits are provided to those individuals because they operate
beyond the reach of retirement contribution programs. A specific limitation
in the social security system of less developed countries is the lack of
consistency in income payment and reporting. Only if the government can
capture the informal labor market will these design alternatives increase the
coverage of the social security program. The model suggested in the
"'I Id. at 9-10.
:82 See generally ASHER, supra note 4.
83 See HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 2.
114 THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995: WORKERS IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 257 (1995).
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Comment attempts to address this problem by reducing the incentives for
avoidance. In addition, the proposed reform model advocated here would
provide coverage to those who intermittently work in formal and informal
labor markets.
Second, the World Bank multi-pillar model does not provide a
specific policy recommendation. This cautious, but indeterminate approach
recognizes that the exact mix of policy choices depends on the nation's
starting conditions, expectations, and financing constraints.1 5 The World
Bank leaves the design of a social security program relatively open. The
multi-pillar model requires examination of the existing system, and an
application of the World Bank's tools to meet the projected needs. This
Comment attempts to overcome the model's generality by applying the
model to the Philippines' current situation.
IV. APPLYING THE WORLD BANK MODEL TO THE PHILIPPINES AND
CUSTOMIZING THE MODEL TO MEET EXPECTED NEEDS
The World Bank model does not offer guidance on the relative size of
each of its pillars. The World Bank instead encourages these pillars to be
adopted in a country-specific manner, leaving substantial discretion in the
final design.1 86 The World Bank's pillars are modular pieces that can be
shaped and combined to meet the needs of a particular nation. Based on a
survey of the challenges associated with the SSS, this Comment argues that
the Philippines should adopt a blended "hypothetical account" first-pillar
system, and add a pillar two and pillar three defined contribution program to
the SSS. This proposed reform model continues to provide the strong
protections associated with the SSS, but does so at reduced risk and with
increased flexibility.
A. Redefining the SSS Benefit Formula from Defined Benefit to a
"Hypothetical Account" First-Pillar is Advantageous
Under the World Bank model, there are two alternate first-pillar
designs. The Philippines should modify its current defined benefit first-
pillar and replace it with a hypothetical account first-pillar. A hypothetical
account system does not alter the national government's role in providing
income security via a first-pillar, but it represents a paradigm shift in the
195 HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 7.
"S' Id. at 2.
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way the benefit is characterized. 187 Adopting a hypothetical account benefit
formula has specific advantages. Benefit obligations under this type of
formula are more definite. Consequently, a hypothetical account formula
reduces the national government's overall risk exposure.
1. Proposed Attributes of a Hypothetical Account Pillar-One Program
for the Philippines
The Philippines should modify the existing benefit structure of the
SSS to be a hypothetical account benefit formula. Under a hypothetical
account system, each retiree's benefit is more definite. Under this proposed
system, an individual's account balance would be accumulated over time 88
with contributions credited to the worker's personal account. Periodically,
the value of the account is increased according to a hypothetical rate of
return, 1 9 much like a bond receiving interest. Over time, new contributions
are added and in effect accumulated account balances will earn compound
interest. 90
The available series of retirement payments, including any survivor
benefits or lump-sum payments under the redesigned program should also be
readjusted to make the value more definite. If such a change is adopted, the
total value payable is determined under the individual's hypothetical
account. All distributions from such account will reduce the value of the
hypothetical account. At retirement, the account is converted into an
annuity1 9' that is exactly equal to the individual's life expectancy. Over time,
the annuity factors are readjusted to compensate for current life expectancies
187 A cash balance plan uses the terminology of defined contribution systems for building a defined
benefit pension. LINDEMAN, supra note 7, at 4. Participants get an annual contribution from wages
credited to their "account." Id. at 6. Each subsequent year, the account is credited with "interest," set by
referencing an external indicator. Id. Over time, the balance accumulates, with reference to principal and
accumulated earnings. HOl7MANN, supra note 5, at 7 n.1; LINDEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 7 n.6.
: LINDEMAN, supra note 7, at 6.
9 While similar to investment earnings, the growth factor can be linked to a variety of factors iike
GDP growth, average wage growth, or aggregate wage growth. HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 7 n.1. Each
return design has different fiscal implications under different economic, demographic and employment
conditions. This choice of a return index is an integral part of the total retirement system design. Id. at 7.
See also LINDEMAN, supra note 7 (noting that the choice of the indexing factor has implications for the
system's long-term stability).
is0 Note that because the account is hypothetical, there are no assets earning compound interest that
are being held by the account. See supra note 13. The funding assets and the liabilities as expressed by the
benefit formula can be specifically disconnected. Id. Financial risk management techniques in asset
selection can be used in order to hedge the liabilities to reduce the risk of financing the system. RoSS ET
AL., supra note 63, at 641-703.
'9' HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 7 n.1.
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and interest rates. 192 This readjustment serves to manage the demographic
risks within the existing market conditions.1 93 An inflation-adjusted annuity,
with related actuarial factors, can be constructed by using the debt market's
assets characteristics, 194  which helps eliminate inflation risks from
retirement income payments. Similarly, any lump sum payment or
adjustments for survivor annuity payments would reduce the monthly
amount payable to the retiree.
In adopting this new design, contributions should be redefined so that
the full contribution is included for income tax purposes, with the employee
making the entire contribution. 95 This would capture both the "employer"
and "employee" contributions. In addition, the 12,000 pesos per month
wage limit would be eliminated. Thus, this change would make the social
security tax progressive instead of regressive. Employers would continue to
be responsible for collecting and transmitting the payment to the Social
Security Commission as part of their payroll practices.
1 96
2. There Are Advantages to Redefining the Benefit Obligations in the
Current System
Changing the SSS to the pillar-one benefit formula described above
would better manage demographic risks in the Philippines and reduce the
national government's overall financial risk by turning the social security
obligations into a liability that mimics debt instruments in the financial
markets. The underlying economic performance of a hypothetical account is
similar to a U.S. Savings Bond (Series EE), in that the principal is always
secure, but interest is periodically capitalized.' 97  The Philippines already
192 Id. This constant readjustment helps maintain a more sustainable benefit level. Id. Actuarial
tables can encompass a variety of risk factors, and single factor tables actuarially shift costs to higher risk
populations. See Smith, supra note 76.
193 HOLZMANN, supra note 5.
194 The presence of both fixed interest and inflation-adjusted securities allows policy makers to
directly measure the real interest rate. MISHKIN & EAKINS, supra note 42, at 61. Without inflation
adjusting securities, the process of estimating real interest rates is more complex, but can be achieved. See
id. (discussing how to empirically estimate the real rate of return in the absence of inflation indexed bonds).
Once a real rate of return is established, discount rates for inflation-protected forms of payment can be
deduced. See PtNERA, supra note 80.
'95 Shifting more of the contribution to workers would increase the individual awareness of the cost
of providing state social security pensions. LINDEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 14.
'96 Pension systems almost invariably make the employer responsible for withholding the employee
contributions from the employee's pay and depositing the contributions with the tax collection agency.
THOMPSON, supra note 112.
i97 See generally BUREAU OF PUBLIC DEBT, UNITED STATES DEP'T. OF TREASURY, THE SAVINGS
BONDS OWNERS MANUAL (2002), http://www.savingsbonds.gov/mar/marsbomtoc.htm (last visited Dec. 31,
2002).
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issues and manages government bond liabilities, and this reform model
creates social security liabilities with very similar characteristics.'
98
Having bonds as investments would be the most appropriate financial
hedge because the liabilities would behave like a bond.' 99 Thus, moving to
this type of benefit formula would justify the divestiture of the stocks in the
Philippines' current investment portfolio, which would also reduce the
manipulation of the market associated with the government's holding of
substantial private stock investments. 20 0  The process of selling the stocks
would need to be appropriately managed to avoid any major stock market
crash in the transition.
The current tax rate in the Philippines would be sufficient to cover a
hypothetical account system without undermining the existing social safety
net.2°' Because the employee would be responsible for the entire
contribution under the proposed reform, the tax rate would be progressive
because of the income tax treatment,20 2 and the system costs would be fully
disclosed to the employee.20 3 There would be no implicit costs, because all
forms of payments would reduce the account balance. In addition, there
would be no government investment discretion; instead, all asset
accumulation would correlate with liabilities. Combining all the cash-
account balances could identify the total system liabilities. The forms of
payment would be unaltered, leaving the life insurance protections in
place.204 In addition, the modified benefit formula would protect against
inflationary risk during both the accrual 20 5 and payment periods.
Moving to a hypothetical account design would not require any
modification to the current institutional framework employed in the
198 ASHER, supra note 4.
199 See ROSS ET AL., supra note 63, at 642-69 (explaining introductory financial risk management
strategies).
200 See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.
201 In Poland, under the reformed cash-balance design, the contribution account necessary to fund the
reformed benefits is nine percent of payroll. LINDEMAN, supra note 7.
202 The labor tax contribution rates would match the progressive nature of the income tax. See PRICE
WATERHOUSE, supra note 86, at 353.
203 LINDEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 14. The employee would contribute the total costs of the
system and the legal and economic burdens of contributions would be congruent. See generally PINERA,
supra note 80.
204 Under the proposed hypothetical account design, forms of payment would be actuarially
equivalent. Hence, an individual who would require a joint-and-survivor annuity form of payment would
have their benefit reduced accordingly under the appropriate actuarial calculation.
205 If the accrual reference is a market interest rate, the expressed rate of interest reflects both a real
interest rate and a rate of inflation. MISHKIN & EAKINS, supra note 42, at 58 (explaining that under the
Fisher equation, the nominal rate of interest equals the real rate of interest plus inflation). Consequently,
based on the Fisher principle, the accumulating benefit formula would be hedged against inflation. See Id.
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Philippines. 20 6 The method of tax collection and benefit distribution would
be unchanged.2 07 However, the way in which benefits are characterized and
tracked would be altered.20 8  While this does not directly address the
challenges posed by informal labor, the incentives to evade social security
tax would be reduced.2 °9 In addition, the hypothetical account system would
provide coverage for those who intermittently work in formal and informal
labor markets, since there is no minimum number of required contributions.
B. The Philippines Should Add a "Pillar-Two" Component to Use
Market Assets to Fund Income Security
The Philippines should add a pillar-two component to the proposed
reformed SSS. 21° The hypothetical account pillar-one provides a basic level
of poverty protection, guaranteed by the Philippine government.2 1 A pillar-
two component could augment this poverty protection by requiring each
individual to accumulate assets for his or her own retirement. Under this
system, a Philippine worker would be required to contribute a portion of his
or her wages into a savings account. The account would be invested and
should grow over time. At retirement, the account would provide a source
of retirement income.
A pillar-two program provides a fully funded source of retirement
income that gives the individual greater protection against risks than the
pillar-one alone. 212 There are specific advantages to adding a pillar-two
design: 1) the individual has increased retirement income; and 2) there are
collateral macro-economic benefits to having increased domestic capital
managed by the private sphere. Consequently, these changes have the
overall impact of increasing benefits to retirees while reducing the overall
risk to the national government.
206 The Social Security Commission currently in operation in the Philippines coordinates tax
collection, benefit tracking, payments and investment management. OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH,
supra note 10, at 283.
27 See id.
208 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1.
201 Under a hypothetical account design, tying benefits to contributions actually paid minimizes labor
market disincentives. LINDEMAN, supra note 7.
210 Id.
211 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
212 HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 9-11.
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1. Adding a Pillar-Two System Would Further Protect the Retiree
Adding a pillar-two program would further strengthen the stability of
the retirement system for the individual participant.2 13  Under a pillar-two
system, a4ercentage of wages are required to be transferred into savings
accounts.
Participants in defined contribution systems have benefits from the
second pillar equal to their contributions, plus earnings and interest, less any
administrative fees. 215  The individual, rather than the government, would
select how the account is invested. Containment of fees 2 16 and overall
market performance are critical factors to the stability and adequacy of the
income stream produced by defined contribution programs.
a. Using market assets exposes participants to uneven asset performance
and changing asset values
Second-pillar financial performance is based largely on the
performance of the financial markets.21 7  By spreading financial instrument
ownership through pension accounts, the benefits associated with market
appreciation can be widely enjoyed by the public. This design. can be used
to transfer state held assets, 218 or to more broadly distribute market assets, in
an effort to more equitably distribute the benefits of economic growth.
213 The first-pillar would be maintained to provide a baseline of income. See discussion supra Part
I.A. 2 14 For example, Chile requires ten percent of wages to be contributed to its retirement system.
OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 75. Note that Chile does not maintain a pillar-one, so
a much smaller contribution would be appropriate.
"' ASHER, supra note 4.
2,6 Fees reduce the net benefit provided by pillar-two programs. ASHER, supra note 4. Since Chile
adopted this design, account management fees have been reduced from 15% of accumulated assets in 1983
to 1.8% in 1993. SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, THE CHILEAN PENSION REFORM: A PIONEERING PROGRAM 18
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 5811, 1996). As of 1993, these costs are in line with U.S.
and U.K. insurance companies and mutual funds. Id. Because of the fixed cost nature of the fee structure
for most financial institutions, it is doubtful that a second pillar of less than 4-6% of payroll would be cost
effective. LINDEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 16. While fees may be reduced over time, higher fees
(especially early on) have a cascading effect on retiree wealth due to the compounding nature of the assets.
See ROSS ET AL., supra note 63, at 116 (discussing future value formulas).
217 LINDEMAN ETAL., supra note 2, at 12.
218 Chile used the funds to buy formerly state-owned businesses. EDWARDS, supra note 216, at 3-5.
The efficiency improvements to those assets and the resulting increase in market value was distributed
broadly through the pension funds. Id. at 4. These new accounts could also be potential buyers for state
owned financial assets. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2 (selling existing government stock market
holdings would need to be conducted so that a financial market crisis is not created).
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While the expected return is positive, and higher than the individual expects
219to receive under the pillar-one program, financial markets are inherently
volatile. Financial instruments are priced to balance the ratio of expected
return with the level of volatility. 22° The impact of short-term volatility has
significant effects on the security of retirement income from this pillar and
leaves a sizeable difference in the value of the benefits received by different
retirees. 22 1 A balanced financial portfolio generally reduces the risk of loss
associated with this volatility, but does so by reducing overall portfolio
return when markets are rising.222 While the market usually outperforms
government bonds, this increased performance only comes with increased
volatility.
223
A sudden collapse of stock and bond markets would erase any asset
accumulation in this pillar. Such a collapse would also have the lasting
effect of decreasing benefits for future retirees because of the present value
impact on future retirees of early contributions. 224 Pillar-two programs place
a heavy burden on general government economic policy225 to ensure that the
financial markets are strong enough to support this social program.
b. The expected benefits of using market assets to fund retirement
income via a pillar-two component outweigh the potential risks
Despite the potential risks, pillar-two programs provide substantial
benefits to retirees. Assuming that the fees of investment managers do not
excessively erode the expected investment return, the economic risk to the
individual associated with the second pillar does not eliminate the expected
benefits of investment gains.
Over the long term, benefits invested in this manner will provide
returns similar.to return on capital assets. These returns should be greater
219 Under the Capital Asset Pricing Model, investments in diversified portfolios are priced so that
expected appreciation comes only with increased volatility. ROBERT HAUGEN, MODERN INVESTMENT
THEORY 212 (James Boyd et al. eds., 4th ed. 1997).
220 id.
221 MAX ALIER & DIMITRI VI-rAS, WORLD BANK, PERSONAL PENSION PLANS AND STOCK MARKET
VOLATILITY 21 (1999).
222 Id.
'2' Id. at 39. Alier and Vittas examined a number of financial strategies to attempt to reduce the
market risk associated with maintaining personal retirement accounts invested in market assets, but using
financial modeling, they were unable to create an investment strategy using market assets that reduced the
overall risk without losing substantial expected return of the financial assets. Id.
224 HOLZMANN, supra note 5, at 17.225 See generally JOHN COGAN & OLIVIA MITCHELL, THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN SOCIAL
SECURITY REFORM: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION (Pension Res. Council, Working
Paper No. 2002-13, 2002).
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226
than the rate of return on government bonds. This method of pillar-two
investment has been successfully employed in other developing countries.
In Chile, for instance, this type of benefit accrual greatly increased the
retirement income to elderly populations. 227 The stellar investment returns
achieved by Chile,228  however, will be difficult to replicate in other
nations.2 29  Despite this, experience shows that over time the expected
benefits per contribution dollar from this pillar exceed those under a pillar-
one design.23 °
While there are disadvantages to a pillar-two design generally, these
risks are manageable under a blended approach. Under this plan there would
be no lifetime income guarantees or specific inflation protections provided
by the government. The first-pillar hypothetical account program managed
by the government ensures an above-poverty level of lifetime income to
retirees. 31 Pre-retirement inflation risk is presumed protected by market
forces through asset pricing.232 Normally, financial assets are priced to give
a rate of return in excess of inflation in addition to compensating for the
level of volatility. 233  Post-retirement inflation risks would also be hedged
by individual asset selection. For instance, an individual would be able to
226 HAUGEN, supra note 219, at 212 (Under the Capital Asset Pricing Model, investments in
diversified portfolios are priced so that expected appreciation comes only with increased volatility.); see
also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 127 (showing that private sphere asset managers exceed public asset
manager performance).
227 In Chile, average replacement rates under the new system (as of 1995) were 78%. EDWARDS,
supra note 216, at 23. This is much higher than the average of 50% under the old system. Id.
22' There is some contention over the actual real net rate of return the participants have enjoyed.
Barbara Kritzer, Social Security Privatization in Latin America, 63 [UNITED STATES] SOC. SEC. BULL. 1,
21 (2000). CB Capitales, a Chilean investment company, estimated that the average net return to the AFP
participant between 1982 and 1998 was only 5.1%. Id.
229 Businesses were sold to fledging pension funds at a discount, and at the time of privatization were
poorly managed. Edwards, supra note 216, at 4. Little government effort was expended in restructuring
the entities so as to attain full market value of the assets. Id. The decreased cost of the assets initially
acquired by the pension funds from the Chilean government increased the eventual return to the funds,
which over time has increased the accumulated value of the assets and made the system more fully funded.
See Ross et al., supra note 63, at 341 (calculating fmancial returns involves comparing the current price
with purchase price).
230 Investment assets would be priced for a risk premium. See HAUGEN, supra note 219, at 212.
(presuming that asset valuation under the Capital Asset Pricing Model the expected return of financial
assets increases only as market volatility increases).
231 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
232 Under the Fisher equation, the nominal rate of interest on government bonds equals the real rate of
interest plus inflation. MISHKIN & EAKINS, supra note 42, at 58. Further, other potential investments under
the Capital Asset Pricing Model are priced by reference to these potential investments. HAUGEN, supra
note 219, at 212. Thus all market assets, if the markets are efficient, are priced to exceed the rate of
inflation.
233 Id.
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buy an inflation-adjusted annuity to reduce this risk. By making any such
election optional, any forced forms of payment subsidies are eliminated.234
2. Adopting a Second Pillar Program Will Have Collateral Advantages
on Economic Development in the Philippines
Aside from strengthening individual retirement protections, the
adoption of a defined contribution program will create general economic
benefits. Such a model has been successful in stimulating economic growth
in other developing countries.23 5  The formation of privately managed
pension funds creates substantial long-term capital accumulation236
controlled by institutional investors.2 37 This capital provides the means for
further economic development controlled by the private sphere. The
presence of alternative financial institutions also provides relief on the
banking system, 238 which strengthens the financial system and can broaden
the availability of capital.
As previously discussed, the Philippine government currently owns
substantial stock in private corporations. 23  Under the proposed pillar-one
program, stock ownership is no longer an appropriate investment, but selling
the stock presents a substantial risk to the stock market. 240  The asset base
provided by a defined contribution program could provide the means to
eliminate the national government's ownership of publicly traded
securities.41I The proposed reform creates both buyers and sellers in themarket place, and could be structured to avoid any financial market
234 Required annuity provisions using common assumptions transfer value from those who live
shorter lives to those who live longer lives. See discussion supra Part II.B. This difference in life
expectancy is predictable based on the risk level of lifetime occupation. See discussion supra Part II.B.235 After adopting this type of system, Chile has experienced rapid economic modernization and is
widely recognized as having the most open, stable, and liberalized economy in Latin America. THE
WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK GROUP COUNTRIES: CHILE, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extrdr/
offrep/lac/c12.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK, GROUP COUNTRIES]. At the
time of the social security transition, Chile was under military rule. EDWARDS, supra note 216, at 8.
236 PINERA, supra note 80.
237 In Chile, the pension funds created the largest group of institutional investors in the Chilean stock
market. THE WORLD BANK, GROUP COUNTRIES, supra note 235.
'38 The development of contractual savings institutions like pension funds is associated with
increased efficiency of the banking system and greater resilience to credit and liquidity risks. GREGORIO
IMPAVIDO ET AL., CONTRACTUAL SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS AND BANKS' STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY 1
(2001c See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
"0 See discussion supra Part II.B.
241 See LINDEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 19 n.21 (describing the transition of a single-pillar to a
multi-pillar program by using the selling the previously accumulated financial assets, the sale of which is
offset by the new second-pillar accounts).
VOL. 12 No. 2
FACING THE AGING WAVE
shocks.242 The divestiture of national government ownership of publicly
traded securities would improve the use of existing capital243 and reduce the
risks associated with changing the first-pillar.
3. The Risk Exposure to the National Government is Reduced
Aside from the private sphere economic benefits and increased
available capital, a pillar-two program could reduce the overall risk exposure
of the national government. Under pillar-two defined contribution systems,
benefit accumulation is mirrored by the funded accounts.24  Assets and
liabilities are directly linked, both on a systemic and individual level.2 45 The
national government is not exposed to any demographic or market financial
risks relating to benefit formulas or investment choices from the pillar-two
component.246 Further, because of the ability to divest the currently held
market assets, the overall risk of the pillar-one transition and the financial
risks associated with the overall program are reduced.
While not serving as a guaranty, the national government can still
enhance the income from a pillar-two program through tax subsidies.
24 7
Enhanced tax treatment, either through a tax deduction or a tax credit for
contributions, can increase the overall income to retirees; individual costs
are regressive when a deduction-based subsidy is used but more equitable
248
when a tax-credit is used. The costs of the subsidy would depend on
when the assets are contributed; the costs of subsidies could be financed
over time, rather than only during retirement.
C. The Philippines Should Adopt a "Third-Pillar" Private Sphere
Mechanism to Supplement Retirement Income
While third-pillar programs can take a variety of forms,249 the
Philippines should adopt third-pillar private sphere mechanisms in the form
of tax-subsidized personal savings accounts to enhance retirement income.
242 See id.
243 See THE WORLD BANK, PENSION PRIMER, supra note 127, at 1-4 (demonstrating that because of
political influence, the assets managed by public managers under-perform those managed by private
managers).
ASHER, supra note 4.
245 Id.
246 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
247 Vittas, supra note 178, at 4.
248 Id.
249 See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, RETIREMENT PLANS FOR SMALL BUSINESS, Pub. No.
560 (2002) (reviewing the potential retirement plans available to small businesses in the United States).
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Tax-subsidized savings accounts, or "individual retirement accounts" are
discretionary personal savings accounts that provide tax incentives for
earmarking the assets for retirement. 250  This Comment recommends that a
third-pillar program supplement the above described first-and-second pillar
systems.
Aside from further diversifying the source of retirement income, third-
pillar systems are funding programs that can be easily changed to meet
social needs that equitably increase retirement income over the long-term.
There are also countrywide economic benefits to adopting this type of
system. Under a pillar-three system the government provides tax subsidies
to encourage the worker to save for his or her own retirement. 251 The
worker would affirmatively elect to contribute funds to a special retirement
savings account, in return for which the government would receive a tax
credit.
1. Subsidized Individual Retirement Accounts Provide Enhanced
Retirement Income and Maintain Lifestyle Expectations for the Aging
Third-pillar individual retirement accounts could create enhanced
retirement income for the aging, and allow the individual to determine his or
her lifestyle during retirement. Third-pillar systems, as a complement to
second-pillar systems, use market assets to fund retirement income. Instead
of forcing an individual to save like a second-pillar, third-pillars encourage
252saving through tax subsidies. These systems exchange tax benefits for
253
asset utilization during retirement. For example, in the United States
individuals are given a tax incentive to contribute money to private
retirement plans,254 such as IRAs or 401(k)s, but face an additional tax
penalty if the money is withdrawn before retirement. 5 The non-mandatory
nature of these funds shifts the role of these third-pillar systems from
250 Generally, there are three tax flows that can be taxed: contribution, accumulation, and distribution.
ASHER, supra note 4. In the U.S., individual retirement accounts provide incentives in each of these areas
to provided targeted benefits; a regular IRA is a deductible (functionally pre-tax) contribution, tax-free
accumulation, and taxed on distribution. I.R.C. §§ 219, 408 (2002). A Roth IRA is an after-tax
contribution, tax free accumulation and tax free distribution. Id. § 408A. A non-deductible IRA is taxed
on contribution, tax-free accumulation, and earnings are taxed when distributed. Id. §§ 219, 408.251 ASHER, supra note 4.
252 In the United States, the tax expenditure for retirement plans is the second largest tax expenditure,
and is in excess of $100 billion annually. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2001-2005 18 (2001).
253 ASIER, supra note 4.
2- I.R.C. § 219.
211 Id. § 72(t).
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welfare maintenance to lifestyle maintenance. 6 Third-pillar systems place
the financial control solely in the hands of the individual. Nevertheless, in
order to benefit under a third-pillar design, an individual must have the
financial capacity and desire to save current income for future retirement.
a. Creating appropriate tax subsidies
In designing tax-subsidized individual retirement accounts, there are
equitable concerns regarding to whom the system benefits accrue.
257
Because the primary mechanism for inducing participation is through a
25825
current above-the-line tax deduction or income exclusion,25 9 the design of
the system benefits the more affluent worker. The benefits of the private
sphere system are inversely allocated along the marginal tax rate (benefits
increase to the more affluent) where a deduction is used.260 Where a tax
credit is used, benefits are tax neutral (equally benefiting the poor and
affluent workers). 26' Income limitations and phase-outs can be used to limit
the availability of the tax subsidy for the more affluent.262 Under a phase-
out, a worker who earns more than a given amount would be precluded from
receiving any tax subsidy.263 These redistribution tools can be combined to
achieve a more equitable distribution system.264
For example, in the United States, Congress has made specific
provisions to attempt to restructure the monetary benefit for targeted low-
income participants. Congress revised the tax code to allow a tax credit up
to fifty percent of the deferral or contribution, in addition to the tax
deduction or exclusion, which applies to lower income individuals who
make contributions to either an employer or individual retirement plans.265
These distributional efforts do not have to solely focus on income. Congress
also provided age-specific relief for additional accumulation eligibility.
266
In the Philippines, an appropriate subsidy would be a tax credit equal to
twenty percent of the contribution to the retirement account. This would
211 See LINDEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 11.
257 Vittas, Desigining Mandatory Pension Schemes, supra note 178.
258 I.R.C. § 62(a)(7).
29 See id. § 402(a).
260 Vittas, Desigining Mandatory Pension Schemes, supra note 178.
261 id.
262 See I.R.C. § 219(g) (limiting of deduction based on adjusted gross income).
263 See, e.g. id.
264 See id. §§ 219 (providing a tax-deduction for IRA contributions), 251 (giving low income
taxpayers an a tax credit, which applies in addition to the deduction, for retirement savings).
265 Id. § 2513.
266 Id. § 414(v) (providing additional catch-up contributions permitted for those over age 50).
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provide an equal incentive for all taxpayers, and is tax-neutral. The phase-
out could be applied to limit the benefits for the more affluent or to limit the
revenue loss.
b. The risk exposure to adopting individual retirement accounts is
minimal
The risks created by a third-pillar individual retirement account design
are minimal. Benefits in third-pillar programs are fully funded through
267accumulating accounts. As a result, the national government is not
exposed to any economic or demographic risks by adopting an individual
268retirement account program. The government's financial commitment to
individual retirement account plans is limited to any tax-based subsidies
provided.269
Long-term fiscal projections are given so that the cost of the various
savings subsidization methods can be evaluated before the adoption of the
program. 27  The fiscal impact on maintaining the supplemental systems
could be reported annually as part of the general government
expenditures. 2 1
2. The Formation of Private Pension Funds Has Positive Effects on
Economic Growth
The formation of private investment funds has positive effects of
economic growth. The creation of private pension assets helps develop an
institutional class of shareholders, 7 which can help lead to better corporate
governance. In the United States pension funds comprise nearly fifty
percent of the institutional assets.273 Pension funds create pressure for better
274corporate governance, and can have a major impact on the operations of
2617 See discussion supra Part IV.C. 1.
261 There is no risk exposure because the benefits come solely from the individual accounts. See
discussion supra Part IV.C. 1.269 This assumes that there are no performance guarantees. But cf 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1453 (2001)
(creating the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation under Title IV of ERISA, which provides government-
backed payment guarantees of private sphere pension benefits in the United States).27 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 252, at 18.
271 See, e.g. id.
272 Vittas, Pension Funds and Capital Markets, supra note 129, at 4 (noting that generally pension
funds become the dominant class of institutional investors.).
273 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 117 (Robert C.
Clark et al. eds., 8th ed. 2000).274 See Aaron Lucchetti, Restricting Options: Key Fund Managers Get Tough on Issue of Executive
Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at Cl; see also Vittas, Pension Funds and Capital Markets, supra note
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publicly held cororations. In developing economies, it is fair to expect
similar impacts.
27T
The development of contractual savings also enhances the strength of
the financial system. As non-bank financial intermediaries such as pension
funds or mutual funds develop, the credit risk borne by the banking sector
declines.27 6  Across a wide sample of nations, there is a direct, positive
correlation between the percentage of financial assets owned by non-bank
financial intermediaries (including private pension funds) and level of
national income.277
D. Design Reform Conclusions
The Philippines maintains a social security system that is outdated and
unsustainable. There are other models available that would manage
demographic and financial risks and improve the use of domestic capital.
These changes are readily adaptable to the Philippines's existing
administrative capacities and would not materially alter the financial costs
that are already committed to providing income security for the elderly. The
proposed reforms would reduce the risks associated with the social security
system and likely increase benefits.
Moving to a pillar-one hypothetical account style benefit formula
would allow social security liabilities to be managed like a bond portfolio,
which could be effectively pre-funded using government debt obligations to
reduce the program's financial risk. The hypothetical account design would
provide a baseline of inflation protected retirement income for life. The
increased flexibility of the timing of retirement empowers the individual to
take more control over their working lives.
129, at 4 (examining the role of pension funds in corporate governance, in various nations, with specific
emphasis on the interaction of pension funds of the election of independent directors).
275 See generally DIMITTRI VITTAS ET AL., PENSION FUNDS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA: THEIR
PROSPECTS AND POTENTIAL ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1995) (evaluating the expected impact of
pension fund assets on corporate governance in developing economies).
... GEGORIOR IMPAVIDO ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, CONTRACTUAL SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS AND
BANKS' STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY 12 (2001). Once there are other institutions able to extend credit,
banks can either securitize and resell more risky investments or not be the source of initial funding. See
Vittas, Pension Funds and Capital Markets, supra note 129, at 4 (attributing in part the development of
securitization to the investment and risk management needs of pension funds). See also JAMES WHITE,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS TEACHING MATERIALS 137-38 (2000) (arguing that securitization lowers the costs
of funds, improves liquidity, spreads credit risks, lowers a depository institutions reliance on interest
income, and increases the capital adequacy of financial institutions).
277 THORSTEN BECK ET AL., A NEW DATABASE ON FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE, fig. I
(1999).
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An additional second-pillar defined contribution system would
enhance the retirement income of the population through the use of fully
funded accounts. These assets could help develop a class of institutional
investors that would enhance the financial system and spur economic
development. The benefits of economic growth, as expressed through
financial asset appreciation could be spread broadly through the use of
mandatory retirement accounts. The individual would also have the ability
to choose when to receive distributions from the second-pillar account,
allowing greater personal financial control during retirement.
Adding the availability of a third-pillar supplemental savings would
allow an individual to determine his or her own lifestyle during retirement.
Under such a program, assets are accumulated and invested, providing a
source of domestic capital. Like pillar-two programs, the assets in a pillar-
three program would be controlled by institutional investors and help
enhance corporate governance. The tax subsidies could be targeted at
specific income groups, age groups, or more discrete populations. Overtime
the program could be modified easily to respond to changing social and
economic needs.
V. CONCLUSION
If the Philippines moves to a multi-pillar program it would provide
greater security for the individual, while reducing its own risk exposure.
Under a multi-pillar program, the individual has broader resources available,
with greater flexibility to determine what retirement income level is
appropriate and the timing of the retirement income payments. The national
government would continue to provide financial support of retirement
income, but the levels of absolute guarantees would be reduced. Under the
proposed cash-balance design, the total financial commitment is made
explicit, which is easier to track over time. Under the defined contribution
and personal retirement account programs, the government's level of
commitment is limited to the annual tax subsidies.
If the government does not undertake reforms, the SSS will be further
undermined until it is insolvent, effectively eliminating an important
economic safeguard for the people of the Philippines, or forcing the
government to make hefty investments from the general fund. The
Philippines should undertake social security reform now, before the
population shifts further and social expectations make adjustment politically
impossible.
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